✌✌✌✌ THE HINDU ✌✌✌✌
✌✌ Beyond the court’s remit ✌✌
In its recent order banning liquor sale and consumption in three districts in the State, the Uttarakhand High Court has drifted outside the confines of law and entered the domain of morals and desired behaviour. The court has crossed its legal remit by extending a government policy of prohibiting liquor outlets in the vicinity of places of worship, to cover Rudraprayag, Chamoli and Uttarkashi from April 2017. It has also banned tobacco products within a five-km radius of three gurdwaras. The court has assumed the power to make regulations on its own even after observing that the State government “has taken laudable measures to prohibit the sale of liquor in specified areas”. The petitioner had not sought any such ban. The court has used a petition challenging the grant of a bar licence at a location near Haridwar as an opportunity to moralise on the evils of drink. Ironically, the Division Bench has found no illegality in the grant of licence as the bar concerned is situated outside the municipal limits where the prohibition operates. However, it has clothed itself with the power to give “sanctity” to the government order that prohibits liquor in the vicinity of the Char Dham (four holy shrines) by clamping judicial prohibition in the whole of the three districts.
The court has cited Article 47 of the Constitution, which says it is the duty of the state to raise the level of nutrition and standard of living of the people and improve public health, and to prohibit the consumption of intoxicating drinks and drugs. In general, courts refrain from enforcing Directive Principles, though some judicial decisions are based on combining their underlying goals with aspects of Fundamental Rights. The Bench cites several judgments that hold that engaging in the liquor business is not a Fundamental Right. However, these precedents invariably arise from challenges to government policies regulating or prohibiting the manufacture, sale and consumption of alcohol. In fact, earlier this year the Supreme Court refused to entertain a petition seeking a nation-wide ban on alcohol, observing that this was a matter of policy into which it cannot venture. It is one thing to cite constitutional goals to justify state action against liquor or drugs; it is quite another to cite them as a justification for judicial directions. Earlier this year the Supreme Court cautioned judges against assuming powers based on individual perceptions or notions. Howsoever noble an idea may be, courts should be wary of making rules on their own, as it would amount to transgressing into the policy domain.
✌✌ Turkey’s derailed war on terror ✌✌
Turkey is facing a multi-dimensional security crisis. Its forces are deployed on two battlefronts — in the southeast, where most of the country’s 15 million Kurds live, to fight the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK); and in Syria to face off threats from the Islamic State (IS) as well as Kurdish rebels. But these operations have hardly helped the country secure its cities from terror attacks, as seen in Saturday’s blasts in Istanbul that killed 44 people, mostly police officers. The attack has been claimed by the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK), a splinter group of the PKK, which said they were taking revenge for the ongoing military operation in the southeast and the continuing imprisonment of Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK leader. The unrelenting terror attacks over the past few years show that something is wrong with law enforcement and security arrangements in Turkey, a country otherwise known for functional institutions and a tough security regime, or a deep state. Even at the height of the civil war with the PKK, violence was largely confined to the southeast. So what went wrong for Ankara? Part of the problem was the reckless handling of foreign policy and internal security by the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The IS grew in strength under the watch of the Erdogan government which, driven by its hostility towards the Syrian regime, looked away as its border was being used by the jihadists. By the time Turkey started focussing on the IS, it was too late. It could still have launched a coordinated, focussed campaign against the IS. Instead, the government abandoned a peace process initiated with the PKK and opened another front.
Over the past year, the Turkish security forces have turned several cities in the southeast such as Diyarbakir into battle zones. This exposes Ankara’s security dilemma: whatever it does to defeat the Kurdish militancy is deepening the crisis further. Even the ties between the TAK and the PKK are in dispute. Though the TAK calls Mr. Ocalan its leader, it has severed organisational ties with the PKK saying the latter’s “passive struggle methods” are not acceptable. But Ankara is going after every Kurdish organisation whenever the TAK carries out an attack, mostly on security personnel. In recent months, many Kurdish politicians, including Selahattin Demirtas, leader of the largest Kurdish political party, the People’s Democratic Party, were arrested. There is a dangerous pattern in Turkey’s approach towards these security challenges. On the one side it is complacent in the fight against the IS, perhaps because of its geopolitical calculations; on the other, it is using collective punishment tactics to deal with the Kurdish militancy. The current security situation will vouch for this policy’s failure.
✌✌✌✌ THE ECONOMIC TIMES ✌✌✌✌
✌✌ GST recedes behind an impenetrable fog ✌✌
The goods and services tax (GST) would appear to have been postponed indefinitely. True, right now, the only firm indication is that the April 1, 2017, deadline seems pretty much ruled out. Finance minister Arun Jaitley has held out September 1, 2017, as another possible commencement date for the new tax regime. But there are good reasons to doubt if even this is achievable, for reasons of trust between the Centre and the states and uncertainty over the spillover effects of demonetisation.
Demonetisation has destroyed the states’ trust in the Centre, said Kerala’s articulate finance minister, Thomas Isaac. Isaac, while representing a Communist-led government, has been an enthusiastic champion of the proposed indirect tax reform. His sentiments are shared by Bengal’s finance minister and chairman of the empowered committee of state finance ministers on GST, Amit Mitra. Their views matter in the GST Council, which has to vet and approve the revised draft laws for central, state and integrated GST. Whether the council would be able to reach an agreement at its meeting in late December remains to be seen. The other element of uncertainty stems from the withdrawal of Rs500 and Rs1,000 notes. Demonetisation’s fallout will have a bearing on GST rollout.
The Centre has to compensate the states for any shortfall in revenue, the referral base year being 2015-16 when growth and revenue collections were buoyant. If demonetisation results in a prolonged slowdown in the economy, revenue growth would take a hit. But the states would still need to be compensated on the basis of revenue projections from a high-yield base year. If the Centre’s own tax kitty, from which states have to be compensated, suffers a hit, there either would be a reduced amount left for central expenditure or the government would have to suffer a higher-than-planned fiscal deficit. Neither option is desirable in the years running up to the next general elections. One can hope and pray that demonetisation would not lower growth much, or one can push back the GST rollout date to 2019.
✌✌ Beyond the court’s remit ✌✌
In its recent order banning liquor sale and consumption in three districts in the State, the Uttarakhand High Court has drifted outside the confines of law and entered the domain of morals and desired behaviour. The court has crossed its legal remit by extending a government policy of prohibiting liquor outlets in the vicinity of places of worship, to cover Rudraprayag, Chamoli and Uttarkashi from April 2017. It has also banned tobacco products within a five-km radius of three gurdwaras. The court has assumed the power to make regulations on its own even after observing that the State government “has taken laudable measures to prohibit the sale of liquor in specified areas”. The petitioner had not sought any such ban. The court has used a petition challenging the grant of a bar licence at a location near Haridwar as an opportunity to moralise on the evils of drink. Ironically, the Division Bench has found no illegality in the grant of licence as the bar concerned is situated outside the municipal limits where the prohibition operates. However, it has clothed itself with the power to give “sanctity” to the government order that prohibits liquor in the vicinity of the Char Dham (four holy shrines) by clamping judicial prohibition in the whole of the three districts.
The court has cited Article 47 of the Constitution, which says it is the duty of the state to raise the level of nutrition and standard of living of the people and improve public health, and to prohibit the consumption of intoxicating drinks and drugs. In general, courts refrain from enforcing Directive Principles, though some judicial decisions are based on combining their underlying goals with aspects of Fundamental Rights. The Bench cites several judgments that hold that engaging in the liquor business is not a Fundamental Right. However, these precedents invariably arise from challenges to government policies regulating or prohibiting the manufacture, sale and consumption of alcohol. In fact, earlier this year the Supreme Court refused to entertain a petition seeking a nation-wide ban on alcohol, observing that this was a matter of policy into which it cannot venture. It is one thing to cite constitutional goals to justify state action against liquor or drugs; it is quite another to cite them as a justification for judicial directions. Earlier this year the Supreme Court cautioned judges against assuming powers based on individual perceptions or notions. Howsoever noble an idea may be, courts should be wary of making rules on their own, as it would amount to transgressing into the policy domain.
✌✌ Turkey’s derailed war on terror ✌✌
Turkey is facing a multi-dimensional security crisis. Its forces are deployed on two battlefronts — in the southeast, where most of the country’s 15 million Kurds live, to fight the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK); and in Syria to face off threats from the Islamic State (IS) as well as Kurdish rebels. But these operations have hardly helped the country secure its cities from terror attacks, as seen in Saturday’s blasts in Istanbul that killed 44 people, mostly police officers. The attack has been claimed by the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK), a splinter group of the PKK, which said they were taking revenge for the ongoing military operation in the southeast and the continuing imprisonment of Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK leader. The unrelenting terror attacks over the past few years show that something is wrong with law enforcement and security arrangements in Turkey, a country otherwise known for functional institutions and a tough security regime, or a deep state. Even at the height of the civil war with the PKK, violence was largely confined to the southeast. So what went wrong for Ankara? Part of the problem was the reckless handling of foreign policy and internal security by the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The IS grew in strength under the watch of the Erdogan government which, driven by its hostility towards the Syrian regime, looked away as its border was being used by the jihadists. By the time Turkey started focussing on the IS, it was too late. It could still have launched a coordinated, focussed campaign against the IS. Instead, the government abandoned a peace process initiated with the PKK and opened another front.
Over the past year, the Turkish security forces have turned several cities in the southeast such as Diyarbakir into battle zones. This exposes Ankara’s security dilemma: whatever it does to defeat the Kurdish militancy is deepening the crisis further. Even the ties between the TAK and the PKK are in dispute. Though the TAK calls Mr. Ocalan its leader, it has severed organisational ties with the PKK saying the latter’s “passive struggle methods” are not acceptable. But Ankara is going after every Kurdish organisation whenever the TAK carries out an attack, mostly on security personnel. In recent months, many Kurdish politicians, including Selahattin Demirtas, leader of the largest Kurdish political party, the People’s Democratic Party, were arrested. There is a dangerous pattern in Turkey’s approach towards these security challenges. On the one side it is complacent in the fight against the IS, perhaps because of its geopolitical calculations; on the other, it is using collective punishment tactics to deal with the Kurdish militancy. The current security situation will vouch for this policy’s failure.
✌✌✌✌ THE ECONOMIC TIMES ✌✌✌✌
✌✌ GST recedes behind an impenetrable fog ✌✌
The goods and services tax (GST) would appear to have been postponed indefinitely. True, right now, the only firm indication is that the April 1, 2017, deadline seems pretty much ruled out. Finance minister Arun Jaitley has held out September 1, 2017, as another possible commencement date for the new tax regime. But there are good reasons to doubt if even this is achievable, for reasons of trust between the Centre and the states and uncertainty over the spillover effects of demonetisation.
Demonetisation has destroyed the states’ trust in the Centre, said Kerala’s articulate finance minister, Thomas Isaac. Isaac, while representing a Communist-led government, has been an enthusiastic champion of the proposed indirect tax reform. His sentiments are shared by Bengal’s finance minister and chairman of the empowered committee of state finance ministers on GST, Amit Mitra. Their views matter in the GST Council, which has to vet and approve the revised draft laws for central, state and integrated GST. Whether the council would be able to reach an agreement at its meeting in late December remains to be seen. The other element of uncertainty stems from the withdrawal of Rs500 and Rs1,000 notes. Demonetisation’s fallout will have a bearing on GST rollout.
The Centre has to compensate the states for any shortfall in revenue, the referral base year being 2015-16 when growth and revenue collections were buoyant. If demonetisation results in a prolonged slowdown in the economy, revenue growth would take a hit. But the states would still need to be compensated on the basis of revenue projections from a high-yield base year. If the Centre’s own tax kitty, from which states have to be compensated, suffers a hit, there either would be a reduced amount left for central expenditure or the government would have to suffer a higher-than-planned fiscal deficit. Neither option is desirable in the years running up to the next general elections. One can hope and pray that demonetisation would not lower growth much, or one can push back the GST rollout date to 2019.
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